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The time has come for employers throughout the United
States to awaken to the realization that a whole new dimen-
sion has been added to labor-management relations. By the
enactment of the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
sion (EEOC) has been given teeth rivaling those of the NLRB.
Thus, employers will now have to familiarize themselves with
a whole new area of "unfair employment practices, which,
in many cases, carry far stiffer penalties than "unfair labor
practices." It appears that the days of purely voluntary com-
pliance are to be replaced by a whole new policy of affirma-
tive enforcement of the equal employment opportunity laws
through all available sanctions.
I. The E.E.O.A. of 1972-A Change of Direction.
A. Legislativ.e Forerunners of the E.E.O.A. of 1972.
Legislation by the federal government in the area of
equal employment opportunity has had somewhat of a stair-
step approach. Immediately following the Civil War, a merit
system was established for Civil Service employees. These ef-
forts were confined solely to federal government employees,
however, and many years were to pass before legislation would
be passed forcing other employers to follow suit.
With the dawn of the New Deal era, there came a variety
of acts and executive orders attempting to expand equal em-
ployment practices to those contractors doing business with
the federal government.1 These programs met with only
marginal success, as the vast majority depended on either vol-
untary compliance or limited and sporadically enforced sanc-
U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Legislative History of Titles VII
and XI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 2-5 (1965).
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tions to achieve their goals. All of this was to change abruptly
upon the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy.
Elected to office upon a traditional Democratic coalition
of minority groups, President Kennedy was particularly sen-
sitive to the complaints of his minority constituents. Thus,
one of his first acts was to establish the President's Commit-
tee on Equal Employment Opportunity,2 the forerunner of the
present-day Office of Federal Contract Compliance.3 This new
committee differed radically from its predecessors, as it was
not limited solely to the seeking of voluntary compliance or
issuance of limited sanctions. Instead, the Committee was em-
powered not only to impose severe penalties, including contract
cancellation, against offenders, but was also authorized to re-
quire each contractor to engage in an affirmative plan of mi-
nority recruitment. Thus, for the first time, "affirmative ac-
tion" entered the nation's vocabulary.
Then, in 1963, an act was introduced in Congress by the
Kennedy administration which sought for the first time to
regulate the employment practices of private businesses en-
gaged in interstate commerce. The initial bill was designed to
establish an administrative agency similar to the NLRB to
cope with the new "unfair employment practice.' 4 However,
such a plan met with a cool reception in Congress, and the
bill was quickly watered down to provide for a two-pronged
approach, with primary emphasis on voluntary compliance.
As modified, the bill overcame its opposition and became en-
acted into law in the form of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
Title VII forbade the discrimination against employees on
account of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin by
any employer with 25 or more employees, where the employ-
2 Executive Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (Supp. 1959-63).
8 Executive Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 418 (1972).
4 Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, supra note 2.
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er was engaged in interstate commerce. These prohibitions
were to be enforced either by private suits by the aggrieved
party after attempted conciliation by the EEOC or by pat-
tern-or-practice suits prosecuted by the Justice Department.
Most cases were to be initiated by complaints of individuals
to the EEOC, which would in turn attempt to achieve a
voluntary settlement. If no agreement were reached, then the
EEOC would issue a right-to-sue letter authorizing the ag-
grieved party to bring suit in federal district court within
30 days thereafter.5 Although the EEOC often acted as
amicus curiae in these proceedings, it had no power to bring
suit on its own motion.
The second avenue of enforcement was through suits by
the Justice Department against those employers or industries
which were believed to be engaging in a pattern or practice
of discrimination. These suits, in the nature of class actions,
were to become tremendous practical tools not only to enjoin
future discriminatory practices in large segments of the econ-
omy, but also to implement affirmative remedial programs
designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination.
Neither of these approaches proved to be wholly satisfac-
tory. Because of manpower limitations, the Justice Depart-
ment naturally devoted most of its resources toward major
employers in major industries. This, of course, left a large
segment of the work force dependent entirely on the EEOC
for assistance.
For several reasons, dependence solely on the EEOC
proved to be unsatisfactory both from the employer's and em-
ployee's point of view. First of all, the EEOC was deluged
with so many complaints that it was often two or three years
before the case even reached the conciliation stage. Not only
did this delay provide little solace to discharged employees,
it proved to be a severe thorn in the side of employers due
to the Act's notice requirements.
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706 (e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) -5 (e)
(1970).
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Second, the EEOC was not required to notify an em-
ployer of charges against him within any set period of time.
Thus, the EEOC adopted a policy of sending a copy of the
charge only a short time before the concilation process was
scheduled to begin. This presented great practical difficulties
to employers who had long since destroyed or mislaid evidence
necessary to present a defence.
Additional problems were created by the requirement that
the individual aggrieved party finance a private suit should
the EEOC fail in its conciliation efforts. Because many plain-
tiffs had limited resources for prosecuting such suits, an em-
ployer could often defeat a meritorious claim by simply en-
gaging the complainant in an endurance contest.
These diverse problems finally led Congress to reconsider
the effectiveness of a program which relied primarily on vol-
untary compliance. As a result, Congress enacted a series of
amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in the
form of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.6
B. Changes Made By The E.E.O.A. of 1972.
As will be seen, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 has created a comprehensive scheme for regulation of
employment practices in virtually every segment of the econ-
omy. For the first time, civil service employment practices in
state and local governments are to be regulated by the Act.
7
Federal civil servants and members of the military are to be
protected by special provisions similar to those of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.8 Meanwhile, the private business sector is
to be subject to the new enforcement powers of the EEOC,9
with only the smallest of businesses being excluded.'0
8 Pub. L. No. 92-261 (March 24, 1972).
7 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701 (a) (March 24, 1972).
8 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717 (March 24, 1972).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 706 (March 24, 1972).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 701 (b) (March 24, 1972).
1937]
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It is these new enforcement powers which will be the
principle focus of this section, because these powers mean
that the businessperson may no longer ignore the mandates
of Title VII.
1. Who is covered: All businesses affecting interstate com-
merce and all labor unions with 25 or more employees or
members (after March 24, 1973, the number will be reduced
to 15);11 all emplbyment agencies; 12 and most employees of
state and local governments. 3
2. Proscribed activities: It is an unfair employment prac-
tice to discriminate against an employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.14
3. Alterations in enforcement procedures: The entire en-
forcement section of the Act was revamped so as to provide
for three main avenues of enforcement: private suits by the
aggrieved party or his representative; 1 suits on behalf of the
aggrieved by the EEOC; 16 or pattern-or-practice suits by the
EEOC or the Justice Department.17 Briefly, the major changes
in procedure are as follows:
a. The complaint may now be filed not only by an ag-
11 42 U.S.C. §2000e (e) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§701(b) (e) (March 24, 1972).
12 42 U.S.C. §2000e (c) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§701 (c) (March 24, 1972).
13 42 U.S.C. §2000e (a) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§701 (a) (March 24, 1972).
14 42 U.S.C. § §2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No.
92-261, §703, 704 (March 24, 1972).
15 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§706 (f) (1) (March 24, 1972).
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§706 (f) (1) (March 24, 1972).
17 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§707 (March 24, 1972).
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grieved party, but also by the EEOC or by third par-
ties acting on behalf of the aggrieved.18
b. Persons charged with unfair employments practices
(UEP's) are now entitled to notice of the charge within
10 days, 9 thereby partially alleviating one of the prob-
lems discussed earlier.
c. Should an employer somehow discover the identity of
the complainant, in spite of the non-disclosure of Form
#131, and take some punitive actions towards the ag-
grieved party, the EEOC is now empowered to seek
temporary injunctions to force reinstatement, or other
appropriate action pending the outcome of any court ac-
tion.20 It bears note that the EEOC has already used
this new power to force the reinstatement of a female
employee fired for filing charges with the EEOC.21
d. The EEOC has greatly expanded investigative pow-
ers under the new Act and all hearings are now to be
conducted under Section II of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 22 which authorizes the subpoena of witnesses,
books and records, and the taking of testimony under oath.
e. Finally, the aggrieved party has the option of either
waiting for the EEOC to proceed with a suit or proceed-
ing by himself in those cases where the EEOC has failed
to act within 180 days after the charge was filed.2 Thus,
18 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (b) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, §706 (b) (March 24, 1972).
19 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (b) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, §706 (b) (March 24, 1972).
20 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§706 (f) (2) (March 24, 1972).
21 E.E.O.C. v. Liberty Mutual Life Ins. Co., 346 F. Supp. 675
(N.D. Ga. 1972).
22 42 U.S.C. §2000e-9 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§710 (March 24, 1972).
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§706 (f) (1) (March 24, 1972).
19731
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those parties with sufficient resources for a private suit
can now by-pass any conciliatory efforts and proceed to
trial if the EEOC fails to act speedily on their claims.
For those parties unwilling or unable to proceed private-
ly, the procedure will be much as before. The EEOC
will make preliminary investigations, then attempt con-
ciliation where it finds reasonable cause to believe that
a person is committing or has committed an unfair em-
ployment practice. Finally, where no conciliation is achiev-
ed, the EEOC will bring suit in federal district court,
Unfortunately for employers, there is still no statute of
limitations limiting the period in which suits may be
brought by the EEOC.
f. The pattern-or-practice power, the third avenue of en-
forcement mentioned, has remained essentially unchanged
except that the EEOC will have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Justice Department to file such suits for two
years before taking over this area entirely.24
//. Employment Practices Likely To Be EEOC Targets Under
The New Act.
As noted previously, civil rights legislation can no longer
be ignored. The growing number of cases filed with t h e
EEOC-almost 30,000 in 1971, up over 60% from 1970-bear
silent testimony to the increasing awareness of employees of
their rights until Title VII. In addition, it is now becoming
more advantageous for unions to press for job equality due
to their co-liability with employers for discriminatory con-
tract provisions.25
Set forth below are the areas in which a great deal, if
not most, of equal employment opportunity litigation has oc-
curred to date, thereby indicating those practices which are
most likely to receive close scrutiny by both employees and
24 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§707 (March 24, 1972).
25 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 146, A-4.
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the EEOC. Thus, members of t h e business community
should compare their employment practices with those set
forth in the following section. Should a particular practice or
practices be found suspect, steps should be made to establish
a written plan outlining the course of conduct which the com-
pany will follow in order to end the unfair practice. In some
instances it may be psychologically advantageous to advertise
this plan to the company employees, thereby dissuading them
from filing charges upon this showing of the company's good
faith intent to comply with the provisions of the Act. In addi-
tion, should charges be filed against the company, an employ-
er with a reasonable affirmative action plan can realistically
expect a more sympathetic approach from E.E.O.C. investi-
gators than an employer who is either ignorantly or defiantly
violating the Act.
A. Illegal pre-employment procedures.
The two pre-employment practices which most often get
employers into difficulties are the failure to notify a large
segment of the work force of available jobs, and the use of un-
validated screening devices to eliminate disproportionate num-
bers of those persons protected by Title VII.
1. Failure to advertise employment opportunities.
Failure to adequately acquaint minority groups with cur-
rent job openings seems to be the most frequent of all unfair
employment practices for the simple reason that it enables
many an employer to justify a one-race or one-sex work force
by innocently saying:
Why, I might have hired someone besides a white, Anglo-
Saxon Protestant male, but no one else applied."
Needless to say, the EEOC does not give such statements
much weight where the statistics indicate that the employee
ratios in the plant are significantly different from the racial
or ethnic ratios of the surrounding community, especially
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The EEOC frowns upon word-of-mouth recruiting, hav-
ing discovered that employees generally bring in friends of
the same race, creed and sex as themselves. By engaging in
these practices, the EEOC maintains, the employer in many
instances hurts himself by excluding potential applicants who
are more qualified than the person hired.2 6 In any event, word-
of-mouth recruiting is definitely taboo for those employers
subject to EEOC guidelines.27
Failure to list job openings with employment agencies
commonly used by minorities, such as state employment serv-
ices, may be viewed by the EEOC as evidence of a discrimi-
natory intent, because many minority group applicants are
unable to afford the fees of private agencies. Thus, all use
of private employment agencies should probably be concur-
rent with the use of the state agency.
In addition, the employer should insure that any employ-
ment agency with which he deals is aware that the company
seeks referral of all qualified applicants, regardless of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. In order to protect him-
self, an employer should see that all job orders are submitted
to the agency with a written notation as to the company's
employment policies. Failure to take such precautionary meas-
ures could implicate an employer in any unfair employment
practices of the agency, especially where, by virtue of long
use, the employer has reason to suspect that the agency may
be refusing to refer certain classes of applicants.
Those employers who do their own recruiting must be
careful not to state an unlawful preference in their advertis-
ing. Stating a preference for a particular sex is unlawful un-
less sex is a bonafide occupational qualification. 28 Likewise,
the stating of a preference for applicants with college degrees
may be unlawful unless the employer can show that such edu-
26 E.E.O.C. No. 72-2130 (1972).
27 O.F.C.C. No. 101-68 (1969).
28 29 C.F.R. §1604.5 (1972).
(Vol. 9, No. I
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cational requirements are reasonably related to job perform-
ance.29 The methods by which an employer can ascertain
whether his educational requirements are valid will be ex-
plored in the next section.
In summary, an employer must make a reasonable effort
to inform all qualified applicants of available positions. By
so doing, not only will the employer be able to make a de-
cision based on a greater number of applicants, but he may
also find that the most qualified applicant just happens to be
a black, a woman, or a Jew.
B. The use of unvalidated screening devices.
The EEOC views as unlawful the use of any screening
device which tends to exclude a disproportionate percentage
of groups protected by Title VII, unless such screening proced-
ure is reasonably related to job performance.
There are a variety of these devices which the EEOC
has found to be unlawful. Among them are:
1. Disqualification due to poor credit records.
The EEOC has found that one discriminates against mi-
norities by a refusal to hire based on poor credit records. This
decision was based on the 1967 Census Bureau figures show-
ing that 35.4% of non-whites are below the poverty line as
compared to 10.3% for whites. Thus, the EEOC reasoned,
more non-white than whites would get into credit difficulties,
and a refusal to hire based on such a poor credit record con-
stituted discrimination on the basis of race.30
2. Refusal to hire based on sex or marital status.
It is unlawful to exclude a person from a job based on the
sex of that person except where preference for one sex can
be shown by the employer to be a bonafide occupational quali-
fication (BFOQ). It has been the policy of the EEOC to con-
29 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30 E.E.O.C. No. 72-0427 (1972).
1973]
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strue such exceptions narrowly, prompting one commentator
to write that, ". . . the only permissable B.F.O.Q. based upon
sex is that of a wet nurse to exclude a male and a sperm
donor to exclude a female."3' Thus it is safe to say that, un-
less an employer is engaged in either of these businesses, any
exclusion of one sex from his staff bears close scrutiny, as
the burden of proof is on the employer to prove that exclusion
of one sex is not arbitrary.
The EEOC also regards as unlawful the exclusion of one
sex from certain occupations, regardless of customer prefer-
ence. Thus, a hospital cannot refuse to hire a male nurse to
care for female patients.3 2 Neither may a female be denied
the job of sales manager because she would be required to
accompany male clients on company-sponsored hunting trips.83
It is also forbidden to require males and females to main-
tain different appearances. Thus, if female employees are per-
mitted to have long hair, then an employer may not refuse
to hire a male who also wears his hair long.34 Presumably,
such prohibitions extend to dress codes which forbid women
to wear trousers to work.
Meanwhile, state protective laws, limiting the hours which
women may work and the weights which they can lift, are
being overturned in droves where these laws serve to prevent
women from being judged on their individual abilities.85 As
more and more of such legislation is overturned, employers
are becoming less and less sure of which laws to ignore and
which to obey. The Eighth Circuit recently laid down some
guidelines which may be useful. If the law prevents the
31 Murphy, Sex Discrimination In Employment - Can We
Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437, 454 (1971).
32 Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.C.
1972).
3 E.E.O.C. No. 71-2338 (1971).
34 Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
35 Murphy, supra, note 31, at 445.
[Vol. 9, No. 1
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wonr.n from performing some job, it is unconstitutional. How-
ever, if it confers a special benefit upon women, then the
law is not only deemed to be in full force and effect, but its
special benefits must be extended to men as well.3V 6 While it
may be argued that extension of these special benefits to male
employees places an onerous burden on an employer, the em-
ployers should not expect too much sympathy from the courts,
for, "... . federal labor legislation enacted over the last thirty
odd years has placed many onerous burdens on employers."37
Finally, it is unlawful to refuse to hire an employee based
on marital status. The Supreme Court recently indicated that
it may be unlawful to refuse to hire a woman with young
children where males with young children are hired.38 Like-
wise, the stewardess cases have declared that it is unlawful
to refuse females employment, or to terminate it, solely be-
cause they are married, where men with similar jobs are re-
tained after marriage.39 In addition, the EEOC maintains
that it is discriminatory to refuse to hire a female with illegi-
timate children because men are so much more capable of hid-
ing the fact of their parenthood.40
3. Disqualification based on unvalidated educational re-
quirements.
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark de-
cision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,41 held that educational
or testing requirements which tend to exclude dispropor-
tionately high numbers of protected groups are unlawful
unless the employer can prove that such test is a reasonable
predictor of job performance. This rule, as interpreted by
the EEOC, applies to all varieties of tests commonly used
36 Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
87 Id.
38 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
89 Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
40 E.E.O.C. No. 71-562 (1970).
41 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
1973]
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by employers and emloyment agencies as screening devices
for job applicants. Thus, the word test:
. . . includes, but is not restricted to, measures of
general intelligence, mental ability and learning
ability; specific intellectual abilities; mechanical,
clerical and other aptitudes; dexterity and coordina-
tion; knowledge and proficiency; occupational and
other interests; and attitudes, personality or tempera-
ment.4
2
As a result of this decision, the entire personnel systems
of many companies were turned upside-down. Almost all
companies had virtually iron-clad rules that no employee
could advance much beyond shop foreman without a high
school diploma. In addition many companies used one or
more intelligence tests to screen applicants for positions as
office clericals. Suddenly, most educational and testing re-
quirements were presumptively unlawful unless the em-
ployer could prove that such requirements had been validated
in accordance with stringent EEOC guidelines.
According to the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures,43 the validity of a test must be demonstrated
by the following:
a. Statistics demonstrating that the test is predictive of
important elements of work behavior which are relevant
to the jobs for which the applicant is being evaluated;
b. Evidence that no alternative, non-discriminatory tests
are available;
c. Evidence that all testing is carried out under carefully-
controlled conditions, and that the results are evaluated
using uniform, itemized procedures. It is particularly
important in the use of scored interview sheets that in-
terviewers be given lists of objective criteria to use in
scoring applicants.
42 29 C.F.R. §1607.2 (1970).
-1 29 C.F.R. §1607.2 (1970).
[Vol. 9, No. I
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d. Each employer must, where practicable, conduct his
own validation tests using generally accepted techniques.
e. Where an employer is unable to conduct his own va-
lidity tests due to lack of a significant statistical sample,
he may rely on validation tests of a third party if he is
able to show that his employees do substantially similar
work to that for which the test was validated.
Some of the tests which have specifically been found to
have a disproportionate impact on minorities, thus requiring
validation as set forth above, are the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test,44 the Wonderlic Personnel Test,41 the
Bennett-Gelink Test,46 and four sections of the GATB (Gen-
eral Aptitude Test Battery).47 An employer who is currently
using one of these tests is running a substantial risk of a suc-
cessful individual action or even a class action, unless appro-
priate steps have been taken to validate the test. Nor may
an employer permit an employment agency to use such tests
to screen referrals where the test has not been validated for
that particular job in his particular industry.
In summary, a careful review of all criteria used to eval-
uate applicants for employment should be made. Where a
particular test is found to exclude a disproportionate percent-
age of a class protected by Title VII, and virtually all tests
have tendencies in this direction, the test or educational re-
quirement should be validated or discontinued. As a prac-
tical matter, a small employer can probably find a test which
has been validated for his particular application by shopping
around among the various testing services. Homemade tests
should be avoided, unless an employer has substantial numbers
of job openings each year, as such tests must be validated on
an individual basis. Such validation is difficult where the
number of new employees is relatively low.
4 E.E.O.C. No. YB 19-068 (1970).
45 E.E.O.C. No. YB 19-068 (1970).
40 E.E.O.C. No. 68-9-327E (1968).
47 E.E.O.C. No. 72-0691 (1971).
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B. Illegal Practices During Employment.
Title VII not only protects those persons seeking employ-
ment, but also continues to protect them during the entire
employment relation. Thus, employers are required to treat
all employees equally as regards pay, promotions, seniority
and sick leave. Likewise, appearance and behavior standards
must be the same for all groups. Finally, special treatment
must be given to those employees whose religious beliefs con-
flict with usual company policy.
Set forth below are a variety of practices which are com-
ing under increasing attack by several groups, thereby war-
ranting the attention of employers.
1. Unequal pay for equal work
The failure to compensate male and female workers
equally for the performance of equal work has long been a
distasteful practice to civil libertarians, and Congress felt com-
pelled to pass a separate bill, known as the Equal Pay Act,
to deal with this practice.48 This bill made it unlawful for
an employer to pay one sex higher wages than another where
the two groups performed substantially equivalent work. As
amended, the Equal Pay Act covers all employees subject to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, from office clerk to executive,
administrative and professional employees. The Wage & Hour
Division of the Department of Labor is responsible for the
enforcement of the Equal Pay Act, and has been particularly
aggressive in carrying out its responsibilities.
Of course, Title VII also requires that female employees
receive equal pay for equal work, with the failure of an em-
ployer to do so being an unfair employment practice. Thus,
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act have overlapping coverage
of a substantial number of employees, and an aggrieved em-
ployee can file charges with either agency in order to seek
restitution.
48 Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
[Vol. 9, No. I
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Under current EEOC guidelines employers are required
to compensate men and women equally for substantially
equivalent work.49 Thus, the addition of a few heavy chores
to the duties of the males will not justify a higher salary so
long as the basic job duties are similar.50 Likewise, employers
may not pay higher wages to an employee obstensibly being
groomed for a position of greater responsibility, except where
the employee is in a bonafide and relatively short-term train-
ing program.51 Indeed, the EEOC may be inclined to view
such training programs as inherently discriminatory if quali-
fied females among the rank-and-file are consistently passed
over for promotions in favor of male trainees.
Finally, once an employer discovers that there is a dis-
parity in the wages being paid to its male and female workers,
the wages of the lower-paid employees must be raised. You
may not lower the wages of the higher-paid group. To do so
will result in a backpay award for the entire group.52
2. Discriminatory seniority and promotion systems.
Once the EEOC has determined that an employer has
discriminatorily prevented a protected group from working
in certain departments of the company, not only will the
EEOC insist that this group be allowed into that depart-
ment in the future, but the EEOC will also carefully analyze
any seniority system which serves to perpetuate past dis-
crimination. As a general rule, departmental seniority is con-
sidered to perpetuate past discrimination, as it makes trans-
ferring employees quite vulnerable to lay-offs even though
they have many years of company seniority.53 Thus, company-
wide seniority is preferable if business needs make its use
feasible.
41 29 C.F.R. §1604.4 (1972).
50 Schultz v. American Can Co., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
51 Schultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.
1969).
52 Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972).
15 E.E.O.C. No. 72-1704 (1972).
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It goes without saying that separate lines of progression
for blacks or whites, or for males and females, is unlawful.
Similarly, the use of unvalidated tests for promotion to higher-
paying jobs, or admission to training programs, is unlawful
for reasons stated previously.
Finally, the employer must be certain that non-discrim-
inatory criteria are used for promotion. In a recent case,
General Motors was found guilty of discriminatory promotion
practices by relying almost exclusively on the foreman's
recommendation for promotions. 4 The court found that such
a system was inherently discriminatory where the foreman
was given no written instructions as to what factors (and
relative weights) were to be used in evaluating his subord-
inates. GM was further faulted for its failure to provide safe-
guards for averting possible bias by foremen, as well as its
failure to post promotion opportunities to those who might
wish to apply.
Thus, the basic rules laid down heretofore also apply to
promotions and seniority. Every attempt must be made to
insure that the company itself treats each employee with
absolute equality, while at the same time striving to insure
that all employees treat their fellow employees with fairness.
Admittedly, this is a difficult task where many of the em-
ployees are prejudiced against one or more of the groups
protected by Title VII. However, the EEOC has consistently
held that it is the duty of the employer to protect the minority
employee from harassment. Failure to reprimand the offend-
ing employee results in a presumption that such conduct meets
with the approval of the company.55 It is likewise the duty
of the company to insure that employees responsible for the
training of the new employee do an adequate job, for an em-
ployee may not be discharged due to poor work attributable
to inadequate training by a prejudiced co-worker.50
14 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
5r E.E.O.C. No. 72-0777 (1971).56 E.E.O.C. No. 72-0777 (1971).
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3. Failure to accommodate religious beliefs.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 made
specific provision that it is unlawful religious discrimination
to refuse to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's
religious beliefs, unless the employer can show that to do so
would cause undue hardship to the conduct of his business.57
There are, of course, few decisions since this new section
on religion went into effect. However, those decisions inter-
preting this new section tend to do so broadly. Thus, an em-
ployer must assign Seventh Day Adventists to shifts ending
before dusk on Friday where such shifts are available.58 Like-
wise, Black Muslim females must be allowed to wear long
skirts to their office jobs.5 9
In determining what is a religious belief, and therefore
who must be specially accommodated, the EEOC has adopted
the definition of religion laid down by the Supreme Court
for use by draft boards in granting or denying conscientious
objector status:
A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption. . ., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
165 (1965). 60
It is, therefore, the law that employers must grant special
treatment to those employees whose religious beliefs conflict
with standard operating procedure. It is unknown as yet
whether this special treatment includes special holiday ar-
rangements. Presumably, non-Christian employees could in-
sist on working on holidays such as Christmas and Easter,
then take paid vacations on their own religious holidays. In-
57 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
701 (5) (March 24, 1972).
58 Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
5' E.E.O.C. No. 71-2620 (1972).
(0 E.E.O.C. No. 71-2620 (1972).
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sistence on uniform holidays could be discriminatory in those
industries where employees work individually, thus making
accommodation relatively easy.
Because the body of religious discrimination law is just
developing, employers should be certain to keep abreast of
current developments to avoid inadvertently violating the
Act. Especially in this new area of the law, it is important
to remember that just because a practice is of long standing
does not mean that it is legal.
4. Discriminatory appearance and behavior standards.
An employer must use the same standards for appear-
ance and behavior as were described in the previous section
on Illegal Pre-Employment Procedures. Thus, all employees
must be allowed to wear their hair the same length and to
dress similarly. In addition, non-whites may not be discharged
or disciplined due to illegitimate births, nor may they be
discriminated against due to poor arrest or credit records.
All disciplinary actions taken for violation of plant or
company rules must be meted out with an even hand. The
EEOC recently found unlawful sex discrimination where
a female employee was discharged for carrying on a seem-
ingly torrid love affair with a male superior, while the
male involved received only a reprimand. 61 Nor m a y an
employer try to force his employees to accept his own, or
another's, beliefs against social mixing of the races, even
where such beliefs are common in the community. Thus, it
is unlawful to discharge a caucasian female employee for
dating a black.62 It is likewise unlawful to restrict the travel
of black employees to those areas or countries where person
of that race are most likely to be well-received.6
6 E.E.O.C. No. 72-0697 (1972).
In summary, the theme of this subsection is equality. All
61 E.E.O.C. No. 71-2678 (1971).
62 E.E.O.C. No. 71-1902 (1971)
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employees must be required to maintain the same dress and
appearance standards. Presumably, employers who are of-
fended by male employees with long hair can remedy the
situation by requiring both males and females to have short
hair. Likewise, should an employer be faced with males wish-
ing to wear skirts to work, he may make a uniform trouser
rule for all employees.
As to behavior standards, it has been generally held that
employer interference with the lives of employees off the
job (including their sex lives) is forbidden. However, the
employer may, of course, set behavioral standards within the
plant or office which are arbitrary and unreasonable, so long
as they are uniformly applied.
5. Discriminatory allocation of fringe benefits.
It is, of course, elementary that an employer may not
give its white employees more insurance coverage, sick leave,
or paid holidays than it gives non-white employees. Until
just recently, however, employers felt justified in giving their
female employees substantially lower benefits than were
given to males. The reasons for such rationalization are not
entirely clear. However, one common factor seems to be the
assumption among male employers that most female em-
ployees work more or less as a hobby. 4 In addition, this
author is of the opinion that female workers contributed in
large part to these inequities by their own failure to demand
equal benefits.
Be that as it may, it is now unlawful to fail to provide
equal fringe benefits for both sexes. Under the revised
EEOC guidelines, fringe benefits are defined as including:
"... medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement
benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 65
04 U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, THE MYTH A Tm REALITY (1971).
(5 29 C.F.R. §1604.9 (a) (1972).
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These guidelines, which are in essence a statement of the
position which the EEOC will take in litigation, hold it to
be unlawful to condition benefits upon whether or not the
employee is the head of household, since males are more
likely to occupy that status than are females.00 Likewise, the
EEOC views as unlawful the provision of benefits for males
and their families which are not made available to females
and their families.67 An example might be where males can
get low cost life insurance on their wives while females are
given no opportunity to acquire similar insurance on their
husbands.
By far the greatest development in this area is the defi-
nitely established trend towards treating maternity and child-
birth as ordinary temporary disabilities which must be
handled like any other short-term illness. The repercussions
of this development have been widespread. No more may
employers force pregnant employees into mandatory leaves
at a certain month of pregnancy. Nor can medical insurance
policies now fail to cover maternity. Forbidden as well are
the sick pay plans which pay on all illnesses but maternity-
related ones.
Largely responsible for this rather sharp break with the
common law rule that pregnant females should hide their
bodies for three or four months before childbirth and for a
year thereafter 8 was the landmark decision of Cohen v.
Chesterfield Cty. School Bd., 326 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D.Va. 1971),
recently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. 9 There the Vir-
ginia district court found it to be a denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment for a state-supported school
6 29 C.F.R. §1604.9 (c) (1972).
67 29 C.F.R. §1604.9 (d) (1972).
68 See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 467 F. 2d 262
(4th Cir. 1972) (dissent), and Schattman v. Texas Employ-
ment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
69 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972).
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to refuse to treat maternity as a medical disability. In the
words of the Court:
Because pregnancy, though unique to women, is like
other medical conditions, the failure to treat it as
such amounts to discrimination which is without ra-
tional basis and therefore is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 326
F. Supp.at 1161.
The court went on to hold that, since maternity was just
another illness peculiar to females, the length of confinement
of the patient should be a matter solely between her and her
doctor. Thus, the school board had no more business setting
up arbitrary minimum maternity absences than it did in
setting up minimum times during which a teacher should
be out for routine surgical procedures, such as an appendec-
tomy.
The Cohen case was brought on equal protection grounds
rather than under Title VII, due to the fact that state agencies
had not as yet been included within the Act's protections-a
situation remedied by the E.E.O.A. of 1972. However, the
fundamental principles are the same and the wording of the
Court was quickly seized upon by the EEOC and included
in its guidelines. 0
Since Cohen, numerous cases have been filed against a
variety of large corporations, alleging violations of Title VII
by:
1. Failure to pay females absent due to childbirth the
sick pay benefits paid for other illnesses under the collective
bargaining agreement; 71
2. Failure to provide female employees with maternity
insurance, while insuring males against all of their usual
medical disabilities; 2
70 29 C.F.R. §1604.10 (1972).
71 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 52, A-6.
72 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 75, A-3.
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3. Giving preferential reinstatement to employees with
illnesses other than maternity-related ones;73
4. Failure to allow accrual of seniority, pension credits,
and holiday pay for employees disabled due to pregnancy,
while granting males such rights under all of their dis-
abilities.7 4
There seems to be little doubt that many, if not most, of
these suits will be successful. They will also be extremely
costly to the companies involved, for virtually all suits seek
to recover for employees disabled by pregnancy the same sick
pay (plus interest and attorney's fees) as was paid to em-
ployees disabled by other illnesses. Several suits also seek
to recover the costs of confinement which would have other-
wise been paid by insurance.
Therefore, an employer would be well advised to change
discriminatory pregnancy policies as soon as possible, even
if it is necessary to reopen a union contract to do so. In fact,
if the union refuses to reopen, then the employer may possi-
bly make the union co-liable for any damages resulting from
the discriminatory contract clauses.7 In addition, by acting
voluntarily to correct these practices, the likelihood of having
a disgruntled employee file charges against her employer is
somewhat reduced. Thus, by voluntary action, an employer
may be able to evade any accrued liability, as well as the
costs of defending a class action.
C. Discriminatory Retirement Policies.
The final area with which the EEOC has recently found
fault is the maintenance of a retirement plan which either:
U...,establishes different optional or compulsory retirement
ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on the
basis of sex.' '76 Males were found to be discriminated against
73 Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
74 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 146, A-4.
75 See 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 131, A-7.
70 29 C.F.R. §1604.9(f) (1972)-.
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by an employer whose pension plan provided an annuity
for females at age 55, but did not give males the same benefits
until they reached age 60.77
Discriminatory retirement plans also raise potential prob-
lems under several other Federal statutes. For instance, it
would seem to be a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to force retirement of employees before
age 65.78 There is also potential conflict between the Social
Security laws and Title VII, perhaps paving the way for an
argument that the Social Security laws deny male spouses
and their families equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.79 These problems are, however, outside the scope
of this article, and are only raised here to illustrate that the
civil rights-equal employment opportunity field bears con-
tinued watching.
III. Problems Left Unresolved By The Enactment of the
E.E.O.A. of 1972.
Of course, no piece of legislation is perfect, and Title VII,
as amended by the E.E.O.A. of 1972, is no exception. The
major criticisms of the Act seem to be that there are so many
different agencies and forums involved in its enforcement that
an employer seeking to comply with the spirit of the Act is
often unsure as to which judicial body and which agency to
look to for guidance.
The number of agencies involved in administering their
own interpretation of Title VII is staggering. While this au-
thor will not vouch for the completeness of the following list,
'7 Mixson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525
(N.D. Ga. 1971).
78 29 U.S.C. §620 (1970).
79 It is conceivable that an equal protection suit patterned after
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 467 F. 2d 262 (4th
Cir. 1972) might successfully strike down unequal benefits
under the Social Security Laws.
19731
24
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss1/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
it is set forth nonetheless in order to illustrate the magnitude
of the problem:
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
2. The Justice Department;
3. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor;
4. State and local fair employment practice agencies;
5. State civil service commissions;
6. Federal civil service commission;
7. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance;
8. The Federal Communications Commission80;
9. The Civil Aeronautics Board8l;
10. Various state courts.
With such a variety of agencies involved in the adjudi-
cation of equal employment opportunity cases, problems can-
not but arise as one agency prosecutes an employer for a prac-
tice considered legal by another agency. It would seem that
there is also an unnecessary duplication of resources. The
only logical solution to this problem is to vest one agency
with the exclusive authority to bring unfair employment prac-
tice charges against offending employers. Presumably the
EEOC would be given this responsibility, as the agency was
set up for this very function. Nor would the watchdog effect
of having several agencies search out unfair employment prac-
tices be lost by giving the EEOC exclusive jurisdiction to
initiate suits and levy sanctions, for the other agencies could
file charges with the EEOC on behalf of those parties be-
lieved to be aggrieved by the alleged unfair employment
practices.
There is the further problem of having the EEOC go
into the already overloaded court system to seek compliance
with the Act. It seems unnecessarily cumbersome to have the
80 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 148, A-8.
81 1972 Daily Labor Rep. 150, A-10.
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EEOC hold hearings to determine reasonable cause, then
to require the whole drama to be replayed for the benefit
of the court, when the EEOC could be given the power to
issue cease-and-desist orders under procedures similar to those
used presently by the NLRB. In addition, the field of equal
employment opportunity legislation is fast becoming a very
specialized area which may soon require judicial expertise
not possessed by the ordinary district court judge. There still
exists, as well, the problem of too great a diversity of forums
deciding equal employment opportunity matters, for there
are quite a number of district courts scattered throughout the
United States.
It would seem that the most realistic approach to obtain-
ing effective enforcement of the national employment policy
would be through the use of a single agency with the power
to issue cease-and-desist order through a quasi-judicial system
similar to that of the NLRB. The virtue of the consolidation
of the present system to one of the type described is that
there would be a great economy of time, effort and money,
as well as the development of employment policies which
would be predictably enforced. In addition, an agency would
be developed which had the necessary expertise to deal with
an admittedly rather complex area of the law.
Thus, the creation of an administrative tribunal similar
to the NLRB to handle unfair employment practices could be
of great practical benefit to employers. The law would be
relatively uniform and predictable, and, hopefully, quickly
enforced, thereby reducing back pay liability as well as at-
torney fees and court costs. In fact, if the system were mod-
eled closely after that of the NLRB, the need for allowing
successful plaintiffs to recover attorney fees would probably
disappear as most complainants would be represented, at
least before the Commission, by EEOC staff attorneys. This
in itself could be a great savings to employers, as attorney fees
in recent cases often are close to the size of the back pay
award.
In summary, the Act is a potentially effective piece of
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legislation designed to insure not only that employees have
equal opportunity to compete for available jobs, but also to
insure that employers select the best possible employee for
those jobs. However, because the scope of the Act is so broad,
many problems will arise in carrying out its underlying
policy. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the business com-
munity to see that the procedure for enforcing the Act's pro-
visions is as well designed as possible in order that cases are
handled quickly and efficiently. It will do no good to wait
complacently, hoping that equal employment opportunity
legislation will be repealed. Instead, it would be better to
seek actively to design a procedure which is workable, rather
than waiting to see what further indignities Congress may
thrust upon employers. The alternatives suggested may be a
palatable solution. However, it is the hope of this author that
the business community will become involved in the solution
of the problems instead of following the old pattern of wait-
ing to see what comes next, and then recoiling in horror when
it becomes clear what the new burdens will be.
IV. Conclusion.
The major emphasis of this article has been on giving
examples of types of activities forbidden by Title VII, for
an employer must be able to recognize possible conflicts be-
tween his present practices and Title VII before attempts can
be made for a solution. It is hoped that t hi s article will
provide a practical guide for the business community in de-
termining those areas in which their employment practices
may be in need of alteration. In addition, it is the hope of
this author that the analysis of the remaining problems in
the equal employment opportunity area will be of some use
to those wishing to devise alternatives to the present system.
Mary T. Matthies
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